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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
SID JACOBS,
Plaintiff-Respondent~

vs.

No.

DELTA OIL COMPANY
OF UTAH,
Defendant-Appellant.

9708

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This was an action on two promissory notes, each
in the amount of $21,000, payable by the defendant
corporation to the plaintiff.

DISPOSITION IN LO"WER COURT
The case was submitted to a jury on a special
verdict, and judgment was entered by the court thereon
for the plaintiff in the total amount of the two notes
($42,000) plus interest, less an off-set in the sum of
$6,024.00.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant seeks a dismissal of the case
or a reversal of the judgment, or a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties will be referred to as they appeared
in the trial court.
Plaintiff, a United States citizen and resident of
the state of Florida, brought suit in the District Court
of Salt Lake County against the defendant, a Utah
corporation, on September 29, 1960. Plaintiff's complaint included two causes of action, each on a promissory note in the amount of Twenty-One Thousand
and no/100 Dollars ($21,000.00), which notes had been
given by defendant to plaintiff both dated :\larch 11,
1959 and payable at the Chase National Bank in
Havana, Cuba. The note in the first cause of action "Tas
payable September 11, 1959, and the note in the second
cause of action on December 11, 1959. Defendant
admitted nonpayment of these notes.
Defendant corporation filed an ans,ver to this complaint on December 2, 1960 containing the following six
defenses; ( 1) Co1nplaint failed to state a cause of
aetion; ( 2) X otes signed "Tithout corporate authority;
(a) Notes satisfied in "Thole or part by stock delivered
in paytnent of the same; ( 4) Failure of consideration~
( 5) Notes signed as a result of plaintiff's Inisrepresen-
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tutions; aud ( 0) Notes subject to (~uban law under
\rhich there is no liability on the part of defendant.
Defendant a1nended its answer on October 16,
1961~ the day before this case came on for pretrial with
a pleading \\Thich added several new defenses. The "second defense'' and the ''third defense" alleged that a
contract of sale between the plaintiff and defendant
provided that all disputes arising from the contract were
to be determined by the Courts and judges of the city
of Havana, Cuba. Defendants second defense was that
sole jurisdiction of actions between the parties was in
the Havana, Cuba courts and its third defense was that
even if the trial Court had jurisdiction it should not be
exercised, for Cuba was a more convenient forum.
Only those defenses material to this appeal and
eYidence with respect thereto, will be mentioned. In the
fifth defense, defendant alleged that some 42,000 shares
of defendant's stock endorsed in blank had been
delivered over to plaintiff's partner or agent as security
for the two notes sued on, which stock had a value in
excess of the notes and had been converted before the
notes were due. The sixth defense alleged first no adequate consideration for the notes because plaintiff had
represented he had good title to the leasehold of a silica
sand deposit sold defendant, when in fact plaintiff only
bad reasonably good title; and second, failure of consideration for the notes for plaintiff, as part of the contract of sale 'vas g·iven the right to make required rental
payments on the sand mine leases and defendant had
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paid the rentals both prior to and after closing, until
it became satisfied it would not be allo,ved to operate
the mine under the regime of Fidel Castro, but that
plaintiff although accepting payments did not transmit
them to the owners allowing the consideration for the
notes to subsequently become worthless, which, while
after execution of contract of sale, was "prior to the time
defendant elected to allow such consideration to become
worthless." Defendant's seventh defense was that defendant, if liable on the notes, was not liable for each in the
sum of $21,000 in currency of the United States, but "is
only liable in the sum of 42,000 pesos of the official
currency of the Republic of Cuba at the time said notes
became due."
At the trial of the case, plaintiff introduced the two
notes in evidence, together with a corporate resolution
of defendant's Board of Directors authorizing their
execution, and rested. ( R. 80, 90) . Defendant then
called plaintiff as an adverse witness and followed him
with Theo Doerrie, \Yho had been president of the
defendant corporation and had handled all negotiations
and transactions 'vith plaintiff on behalf of the corporation. The only other witness was Alice Forsberg, put on
by plaintiff in rebuttal, 'vho 'vas an e1nployee of the
Salt Lake office of the American Express Company.
1\Irs. Forsberg through her \York knew the rate of
exchange bet\veen An1erican dollars and Cuban pesos
for the year 1959 and testified that during all the year
1959 and up until February of 1960 the Cuban peso
\vas at par "·ith the An1erican dollar. (R. 271, 272).
4
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Defendant's evidence showed that plaintiff, a
United States citizen then residing in Havana, Cuba,
o'rned the leasehold of a valuable silica sand deposit
located in ('1uba, together with certain mining equipalent, tnachinery and motor vehicles for operation of
the sand n1ine. In August of I958, Jack Cayias, aU nited
States citizen and a resident of Houston, Texas, negotiated a deal with plaintiff in Cuba to take over the operation of plaintiff's sand mine. This agreement "·as verbal,
and under it Cayias was to pay plaintiff $20,000, take
oYer the monthly rental payments of the property,
(totaling some $I008 a month) and get an operator for
the mine with plaintiff retaining an interest in the profits
"·ith Cayias. (R. II4, II5). Cayias gave plaintiff
$4,000.00 in United States currency and about August
28, 1968 paid the balance of $I6,000.00 by a check dra,vn
on his account in the First Security Bank in Salt Lake
City, lJtah. (R. 1I5, Ex. II). This check, on deposit
by plaintiff, was returned for insufficient funds. Plaintiff
gave Cayias additional time to make the payment but,
after receiving the check back, required that Cayias make
the required future monthly payments to him for transmittal to the lessors. ( R. 196) .
Fidell'1astro and his revolutionary forces took over
the government of Cuba about January 1, 1959. (R.
113). ''rithin a ,,·eek follo,ving this takeover, plaintiff
received the $16,000.00 payment owing by Jack Cayias
frotn a Steven 'Tan Gelder. (R. 109). He executed a
receipt for this money to the Delta Oil Company "in
return for check received from Jack c,ayias partial pay-
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ment of sand mine". (R. 112, Ex. 7). Although VanGelder was at the time a substantial stockholder in Delta
Oil Company ( R. 260) , according to Doerrie, Delta Oil
had not decided to take over the property and did not
become involved in the acquisition until March of 1959
when a written contract was executed and the promissory
notes subsequently delivered. (R. 213, 214, 255).
The only agreement in 'vriting executed by the
parties was dated March 10, 1959 and provided for the
purchase by defendant and assignment by plaintiff of
all of his interests in the silica sand deposit and leasehold
estate and in the mining equipment, machinery, and
vehicles used in the operation thereof. This contract was
prepared in Spanish by the defendant's Cuban lawyer
(Ex. 4) (R. 189) and an English copy was at the same
time prepared (Ex. 5) for the benefit of the parties.
(R. 102). This written contract signed by the parties
in the defendant's office in HaYana, Cuba succeeded t"~o
or three verbal deals plaintiff had made on the mine but
not with defendant. (R. 127, 188). The English copy
was believed by the parties to be the same as the Spanish
one and was the copy that they relied on. (R. 103).
Defendant was given credit for the $20,000.00
theretofore paid plaintiff by Cayias and 'ran Gelder,
and on March 11, 1959, it executed and delivered the t"~o
notes sued on totaling $42~000 for the balance owing in
money to planitiff. Plaintiff also received in writing a
tilfo overriding royalty in the sand mine production.
(R. 105~ 106, Ex. 6).
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Defendant corporation approved and ratified the
aetions of its president in acquiring the "valuable sand
deposits in c~uba" and in signing notes for the balance
of ~-t:! ,000 by a resolution adopted by its Board of Directors on April28, I959. (R. 233, Ex. 3).

lT nder the terms of the written agreement of sale~
defendant 'vas required to make the future monthly paynlents to the o'vners of the leasehold. (Ex. 5) . Instead
of making these payments to the owners, defendant
n1ade the1n to plaintiff as Cayias had done, after his
check bounced. Plaintiff acknowledged receiving rental
payments from Cayias and others up to the time the
defendant took this responsibility over under the written
contract and that defendant had made some rental payments thereafter. He couldn't recall how many or when
these payments were made, but believed that he had paid
over all he received to the lessors entitled thereto. ( R.
139, 192) . Plaintiff produced checks showing payments
by him to the land owners and the caretaker of the mine
through April of I959. (R. I61, Ex. 17).
Defendant produced proof of the following rental
payments to plaintiff after the March lOth agreement:
The first 'vas a receipt from plaintiff to Delta Oil Company for the April I, I959 rental payment of $1,258.
(R. 165, Ex. I3). The next payment was by a check
dated June I, I959 from defendant to plaintiff for
$1008. (Ex. I2). Another receipt, undated, indicated
pay·tnent of two months' payments of $I,008 each, totalling $2,0I6. (R. 192, Ex. IJ). The only other payment
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by defendant to plaintiff was by check dated October 21,
1959, from Theo Doerrie for $3,000, with a notation on
it stating "Payments to Sid Jacobs for Delta Oil."
(R. 162, 163, Ex. 15). This last check, according to
Doerrie, was to take care of rental payments "~hich 'vere
then several months delinquent. (R. 241, 242).
Doerrie testified that there had been delivered at
Jack Schenin's request 42,000 shares of stock in defendant company as security for the two promissory notes
given plaintiff by defendant, (R. 223, 225, 265) and that
the two certificates representing these shares subsequently came in for transfer. (R. 168). He claimed he
knew this stock had been transferred before he made the
last payment of $3,000 on October 11, 1959, and that
Schenin at that time admitted to him that he had transferred the stock. (R. 249). From the date the stock
had been delivered until October 11, 1959, Doerrie said
the market value of the shares had fluctuated from 15c
to 87c. (R. 250). Defendant's counsel attempted to
establish the date the stock had been transferred, and
asked Doerrie if he had seen the transfer sheets from the
company's registered transfer agent inN ew Jersey, but
the court refused to permit such testimony. ( R. 246,
247}.
Plaintiff denied that Jack Schenin had any interest
in the sand 1nine or the sale thereof to defendant, and
that he "~as his partner. He further denied receiving
any stock as security for the notes (R. 157-158) or
having authorized anyone to accept security for the notes
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his L~·half. (R. 195). D(;fendant did not have any
rtcei pi or other e ,·idence that stock had been given as
sL·L·urity ou the notes as claiined by it. ( R. 261).

GE

Defendant's agents examined the mine and the
~quipn1ent, t..:achinery and vehicles and its operation
before entering into the written purchase agreement, but
ai't(;r the agree1nent defendant never took possession or
\rent back to the 1nine. ( R. 230) . This was because
defendant vt·as unable to obtain an operator for the mine.
(R. 25t;). At the time of the delivery of the last $3,000.00
payn1ent in October, 1959, defendant's president indicated defendant was abandoning the mine and would
rna1~e no further rental payments thereon. ( R. 240) .
It \Vas admitted by defendant that the notes sued
upon by the plaintiff had never been paid. (R. 260) .
.L\._fter each note had become due, in September and
Decernber, 1959, plaintiff contacted defendant's president and had been promised the notes would be paid.
(R. 200, 201). At no time did the mine owners or any
representative of defendant advise the plaintiff that the
lease had been lost or the leaseholds terminated, and that
so far as plaintiff knew this had never occurred prior
to defendant's abandonment. (R. 194, 195, 201).

_iA_RGUMENT
POIN'l" ONE

THE DISTRICT COURT OF S.r\.LT
I.u:ll{E COLT~;'r"\T HAD ~JURISDICTION OF
9
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THIS CASE AND DID NOT ERR IN REJECTING
DEl"'ENDAN'T'S
UNTIMELY
CON'"fENTION 'l,HAT IT SHOULD NO'T
EXERCISE SUCH JURISDIC'"fiON BECAUSE OF A CONTRACTUAL PROVISION
IN AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN TH}~
PARTIES
EXECU1_"'ED
BEl--,ORE
-t\.NY
CAUSE OF AC'l,ION AROSE.
POINT TWO
THIS CASE WAS P R 0 P E R L Y
BROUGHT IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY AND THAT COURT
DID NOT ERR IN HEARING THIS CASE
OVER THE DEFENDANT'S lJNTIMEL Y
ASSERTION OF THE DOCTRINE 0},
FORUM NON CONVENIENS.
The defendant argued its first and second points
together and plaintiff shall respond to both points in
the same manner. Defendant urges under its first point
that paragraph six of the contract of sale entered into
between the two parties which resulted in the delivery
of the notes sued on in this action, was a valid la"rful and
enforceful provision "·hich the court should uphold. This
provision read as follows:
"Sixth: 'fhey renounce to their residence
address and appoints the judges and courts of
the C'ity of IlaYana for the interpretation of this
doctUll~n t if any
. clain1 or con troYersy. should
a rise concerning it ... '·
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'l,his provision is not controlling as contended by
defendant for divesting the court of jurisdiction or
rcq u1r1ng a change of place of trial for the follo,ving
reasons:
.r\.. Suit bruur;ht on notes_, not contract.

'rhis action by the plaintiff did not require the
interpretation of the contract of March 11, 1959 conta~;i~ng the litnitation clause, for it was brought on two
separate agreements; the negotiable promissory notes
executed by the defendant to the plaintiff. These notes
contain no submission clause and are complete and independent documents in themselves.
Under Cuban la"r' according to the affidavit of
J. Justin Franco, submitted to the lower court for guidance and information, it is usual for a promissory note
to have its own submission clause if the parties desire
to limit venue as is customary under Cuban law. The
ai-fidavit, ho,vever~ goes on to indicate that the provision
of Cuban law authorizing this is procedural only and
found in the la''/S of civil procedure of Cuba. (R. 44).

B. Such a ]Jrovi.Yion is contrary to public policy and
void.

Defendant acknowledges that the great weight of
authority opposes its position and holds that such jurisdictional provisions are unenforceable as against the
public policy of the state, but cites two cases which indicate exceptions to this majority view. The many cases
~upporting the unenforceablity position are noted in
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three A.L.R. annotations covering this question found
in 59 A.L.R. 1445, 107 A.L.R. 1060 and 56 A.L.R. 2<1.
300. The general rule recited by these cases from nearly
every jurisdiction is stated in .59 A.L.R. 1446 as follows:
"the courts have quite uniformly refused to give
effect to a stipulation in a contract limiting the
jurisdiction of any action or proceeding with
reference to the con tract to the courts, or a particular court, of another state or county or of
another district in the same state, either as defeating the jurisdiction altogether or as a sufficient
reason for declining jurisdiction; and, in spite of
such provisions, have assumed jurisdiction if the
action was of a transitory character, and the court
otherwise had jurisdiction of the subject matter
and the person of defendant. In some instances
the courts, as subsequently shown, declare such
a contract contrary to public policy as an un,varranted derogation from the jurisdiction of the
courts; and in others simply decline to giYe effect
to it upon the ground that the matter pertains to
the remedy, and is governed by the la,vs of the
forum. The principle, as indicated, is applied
whether the stipulation purports to confine the
jurisdiction to the courts of a state or country
other than that in 'vhich the question arises, or of
another district of the same state; in other words,
"Thether the question is of jurisdiction or venue."
The two cases relied on by the plaintiff Harbis v.
Cudahay Packiny Co._, 241
921 and Mettenthal v.
Masceyni, 66 N.E. 428 are clearly distinguishable. The
Harbis case involved a "Tork1nen's cotnpensation situation arising under the la,vs of another state, and the
Mettenthal ease 'vas a dispute bet,veen t'vo non-resident

S.,,r.
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al:crl:-; \Yho had uo standing before the court except as a
ntattcr of comity.

'fhe present case \vas properly brought under the
jurisd,cL:on and venue requirements of Utah law and
d·, feudant does not contend otherwise, but merely that
the lo\ver court should have refused to exercise its
jurisdiction.
Under its second point, defendant cites the case
of 1\.rfuyer 'l'. Penn .llailroad Co.~ 17 4 F.2d 559, and sets
forth a statement by Judge Learned Hand indicating
that such contractual provisions are not "absolutely
taboo, but only inYalid when unreasonable." This stateInent, it should be noted, was in a concurring opinion
in the case which had been brought under the J1~ederal
Employers Liability Act (FELA). The main opinion
had simply held that a provision limiting jurisdiction
in a contract signed by an injured employee to be
contrary to provisions of the federal act. This question
\ras later ruled upon and this main holding, upheld by
the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
.l-1lc.rander Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad
(--.o.~ 339 U.S. 263, 94 L.ed 55; 70 S.Ct. 26.
'l'he Suprerne Court of Utah reached the same conclusion as the main opinion in the Kreager case, supra,
in Pcicr8on t'. O.f;... R. ~D.~ 110 U. 573, 175 P.2d 744,
another case decided before the Supreine Court holding
in the Boyd case, supra, put the matter to rest. This
a.ouin
,,·as an FELA case where the railroad obtained
c
aa agreen1ent from an injured employee limiting his

13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

potential suit for damages to the United States District
Court. Justice Wolfe, speaking for the court majority
held that such a provision was contrary to the federal act
and void. In a concurring opinion Chief Justice Larsen
rejected any bar by the federal act, but held "the great
weight of authority as well as the indicated policy of the
state, as shown by the construction and the pronouncements of the court, are to the effect that this contract
if interpreted as the trial court interpreted it should not
be enforceable." (The trial court had held the limitation
provision valid. )
All of these cases arising under the FELA are concerned with a provision limiting jurisdiction of a suit
for injuries which had been suffered before the agreement was entered into. Thus, even statements such as
Judge Hand's are not authority for the situation where
the provision is found in an agreement executed before
any cause of action exists.
The cases found in three A.L.R. annotations, supra
show that there is nearly universal holding that if the
limitation provision is executed before any right of
action exists, it is void as against public policy. TJTilliston
on Contracts~ Rev. ed. Vol. 6, p. 4871, Sec. 1725 also
recites this general rule as follows :
"The right of a party to legal redress if he is
injured is jealously guarded by the courts and
generally no agreetnent confining the right of a
party to sue in a particular court ?r .tri?tn:al: or
in the courts or tribunals of a certain JUrisdiction~
or to detern1ine the yenue of a suit in such a '"ay

14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a~.,

to dcp.::i\Tc ti1e defendant of his statutory privilege as to place of trial 'viii be enforced unless
Inade after cause of action has arisen and part of
a fair eon1 promise."
(~.Defendant

failed to make ti1nely a]J]Jlication for
rejection of j uri8diction or change of venue and the
lotL'er court prozJerly etcercised its discretion in this
matter.
'fhis court in the case of Cannon v. TuftJ 3 Ut.2d
-~10; 285 P.2d 843, 845 held that a defendant must file a
n1otion for a change of venue at his first appearance or
at least clearly state his objections to venue in some
IHU~lner at the first appearance. Defendant, Delta Oil
Co. failed to make an objection in any form to the jurisdiction and venue of the District Court of Salt Lake
County in its first appearance and merely filed an answer
reciting six defenses, none of which touched upon the
(1 uestion of venue or jurisdiction. It wasn't until the
day before the case was pretried, namely, October 16!'
1961, after it had been pending in the District Court of
Salt Lake County for over one year that defendant in
a belated a1nended answer questioned the propriety of
the court in hearing this matter, and urged the propositions no'v contended for on this appeal in its points
one and two.

By its general appearance, the defendant waived
any- objections based on the contractual provision, or
th-e doctr]ne forurn non conveniens that it had against
lhe rna ttel· being' heard and disposed of in the District

15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Court of Salt Lake County. See also, 78-13-9, U.C.A.,
1953, the section which indicates that the court may
change a place of trial on motion. No motion was made
by defendant in this regard until the morning of trial.
(R. 36).
The doctrine of forum non conveniens has been
adopted into the Utah law under Sec. 78-13-9, U.C.A.,
1953, which recites the grounds that the court may, on
motionJ change the place of trial. The material provision
reads as follows :
'' ( 3) \Vhen the convenience of witnesses and
the ends of justice would be promoted by the
change.''
This court in Mooney v. D. & R.G. RR.J 118 U.
307, 221 P.2d 628 discusses the doctrine of forum non
conveniens and reviews many cases and leading articles
on the subject. While this case was concerned with the
attempted removal of an action brought under the Federal Employers Liability Act in Utah by a railroad
employee residing in Colorado and injured in Colorado,
the court's language covered the application of the doctrine in this state to all suits. The court said at page 647:
"Granting discretionary po,ver in the trial
court to dismiss the cause for reasons of inconYenience, the po,ver should only be exercised in
exceptional circu1nstances and "Then an adequate
showing has been made that the interests of justice require a trial in a more convenient fortnn. ''
In this l\Iooney case, defendant appeared specially and n1oved to dis1niss based on supporting affi-
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davits and testimony produced at the hearing on its
n1otion indicating inconvenience. Here no affidavit
or testimony was tendered in support of defendant's
position, and all that was presented were the bare allegations recited in defendant's second and third defense
in its a1nended answer. 'I'he defendant alleged that it
\ras prejudiced in the forum because the transactior1
co11cerned Cuban property and that certain records and
witnesses were in Cuba, and therefore unavailable to
defendant, except at extreme cost. No offer of proof
'\as ever made by defendant as to what these records
were, what witnesses were needed, what this evidence
"·as, or how it was material.
rfhe other point urged by the defendant was the
great cost of securing the law of Cuba in a form admissible in evidence in the Utah court, but this contention
appears also to be without merit because both sides
provided the court such memoranda on Cuban law as
they desired to by stipulation.
In Winters v. Turner, 74 Ut. 222, 236; 278 Pac.
816, 821, this court said with respect to an application
for change of venue that:
''r\.n application for a change of the place of

trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the
tr~al -eourt and its action will not be disturbed
except for an abuse of discretion."
(Citing in support of this proposition State v. Certain
I11toxicating Liquors, 53 Ut. 171, 177, Pac. 23.)
It is submitted that the court did not abuse its dis-
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cretion in this matter where it appeared that defendant's
actions attacking the forum were belated and unsupportable, and further, because there was no other apparent
place that this case could be tried. Defendant in its
brief acknowledged the unfriendly relations existing
between Cuba and the United States and the court could
take judicial notice of the fact that diplomatic relations
had been severed bet\veen these countries at the time
the defendant urged dismissal of this case. Further, it
seems extremely doubtful that even if plaintiff could
resort to the courts of Cuba, that he would be able to
obtain jurisdiction of the defendant. While defendant
urges that under Cuban law there is a rule authorizing
"world-wide process" he did not cite any cases in jurisdictions of this country upholding a judgment based
upon such service. It is also basic that the parties by the
provision regarding the courts of Havana, Cuba could
not have conferred jurisdiction otherwise non-existent
on the Cuban courts by reason of this provision. (See
14 Am. J ur. 184.)

POINT THREE
THE
PROMISSORY
NOTES
SUED
UPON BY PLAINTIFF WERE INDEPENDENT CONTRAC'"l,S, FULL AND COMPLETE
ON THEIR FACE, ''riTHOUT AMBIGUITY,
AND THESE N01,ES CLEARLY REQUIRED
p 1\_\rl\IENT IN Al\IERICAN DOLLARS.
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POINT FOUR
II1, XO'l,ES NOT J> A Y ABLE IN AMERIl'.r\N DOLLARS, THEN PAYABLE IN
l~lrl3/~.N PESOS, \\THil~H WERE A'_f PAR
ITH
1\~IERICAN
DOLLARS
WHEN
NOTES BECAME DUE.

''T

Defendant in its brief argued its third and fourth
points together, contending in effect that there was no
evidence presented to the lower court to justify a determination that the notes were payable in American currency or Cuban pesos. Defendant urged that although
the notes were in English and spelled out the amount
due as "Twenty-One Thousand Dollars ($21,000.00) ",
that as the notes were executed and payable in Cuba,
this language could not mean, without additional proof,
American dollars.
By this argument defendant is attempting to make
a new issue which was never presented to the lower court.
The only issue concerning payment in the court below
was whether the notes were each payable in $21,000.00
United States currency or the value in dollars of United
States currency of 21,000 Cuban pesos at the time each
of the notes became due.
Defendant in its "First Amended Original
Answer", under the "Seventh Defense" contained therein, alleged as follows:
"The defendant says that it is not liable to the
plaintiff in the sum of $21,000.00 in currency of
the United States of America on each said note,
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but instead is only liable to the plaintiff in the
sum of 42,000 pesos of the official currency of
the Republic of Cuba at the time said notes
became due."
Because of this contention of the defendant, the plaintiff
presented evidence that at the time the notes became due
and payable the Cuban peso was at par with the
American dollar and was being traded one Cuban peso
for one American dollar. (R. 272). The jury also was
presented a question as to the value of a Cuban peso in
American dollars at the date the notes became due, and
found as part of their special verdict that the value in
American dollars of 21,000 Cuban pesos on September
11, 1959, and also on December 11, 1959, was in each
instance $21,000.00. (R. 56). For the defendant, at this
stage of the case, to attempt to imply payment might
have been intended in another currency other than
American or Cuban, is contrary to defendant's own
pleadings, and the issues presented to the lower court
and cannot be urged for the first time on appeal.
If, as contended by defendant, it was uncertain that
the notes were actually payable in United States dollars
because the parties to the notes had theretofore executed
a contract in Spanish, reciting consideration would be
payable in Cuban pesos, and that these notes partially
paying such consideration were delivered in Cuba and
payable in Cuba, such uncertainty would be resolved by
looking to the currency of the place where the payments
'rere to be 1nade. Thus, if there in fact ",.as such an
uncertainty~ it ",.ould be resolved by determining that
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the notes \Vere payable in Cuban pesos, 'vhich at the time
\Vere equal to i\.Inerican dollars. (See 40 Am. Jur. Paynu:nts~ Section 46, p. 745.)
'fhe promissory notes sued upon we:r:e independent
contracts 'vhich should be treated in accordance with the
clear, unambiguous ter1ns contained therein, which
specify that they are payable in dollars. That this means
American dollars is obvious, and should be the interpretation of any court from the attendant facts and
circumstances, which show that the maker and the payee
of the notes were both American citizens, dealing at a
situs only some 90 miles from the United States mainland, in a country whose currency is the peso and not
the dollar.
Other circun1stances requiring this determination
as a matter of pure contract interpretation are the additional facts that all payments given by the defendant
or its predecessors in interest toward the purchase of this
Cuban property from the plaintiff show the consideration paid for the contract was in American dollars,
(R. II5, I08 Ex. II), and all rental payments made by
defendant or its predecessors appear from the evidence
to have been in American dollars. (Ex. I2-I5).
It is submitted that the word "dollars" and the
dollar mark designation ($) on notes given by an American corporation to an American citizen clearly show
an intent to pay the 11otes in U.S. currency. In 27B
c-·.J.S., Dollar~ p. 974, "dollar" is defined as follows:
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"an unambiguous term, having a settled meaning at law; it necessarily implies money, and has
reference to the legal currency or 1nediu1n of
exchange in use in this country (citing (}oak v.
State~ 196 S.W. 922, 924; 130 Ark. 90; State v.
Downs~ 47 N.E. 671, 148 Ind. 324) as distinguished from foreign money (citing Thompson
v. State~ 234 S.W. 406, 90 Tex. Cr. 125) ."
As to the dollar mark designation of value found on the
notes immediately preceding the numerals, the authors
on page 975 state:
"The usual marks expressive of dollars and
cents, when employed according to general and
long practice, may, to that extent, be treated as
part of our language by adaptation and use."
'l.,he cases cited by defendant do not support its
a. 748, the
position. In Biern,e v. Brown~s Adm.~ 10
court was concerned with legislation enacted by the l\T est
\Tirginia legislature to modify the disasterous effect of
the collapse of Confederate currency and the attempt
thereby to uphold contracts on a reasonable basis. This
case merely revie,vs the legislation in light of a particular
contract. In Omohundro~s Exec. v. Crump_, 18 Grattans
Reports, 763 ,.,.. a., the question "~as whether or not a note
recited to be payable in dollars could be paid in Confederate notes, then worthless. The court did not hold,
as defendant asserts, that the note meant Confederate
specie, but on the contrary held, the legal presumption
that parties intend legal tender, which was gold and
silver and not c~onfederate notes, overcame the contrary
evidenee of intent presented. The court there said the

' r·'.,.
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"·ord "dollars" has a definite signification fixed by law,

and that it is laid down that "where the words have a
kno\\"n legal tneaning, such, for example, as measures
of quantity fixed by statute parol evidence, that the
parties intended to use them in a sense different from
their legal meaning~ though it was still the customary
meaning, is not admissible." (citing cases) The case of
Cornmonwealth v. Stearnes~ 5 Mass. 256 was a criminal
case concerned about the sufficiency of the allegations of
an indictment charging counterfeiting under the laws
of Massachusetts.
There is no prohibition under Cuban law against
contracts or notes payable, in American dollars. The
affidavit of J. Justin Franco (R. 44-51) establishes that
under substantive Cuban law, contracts made in Cuba,
providing for payment in dollars, are properly recoverable in American dollars, which are the only kind of
dollars known in Cuba. The Cuban law, therein recited,
provides that parties may stipulate payment in a dollar
amount, or in any other type or kind of consideration,
and that such special payment is recoverable under the
Cuban law. In other words, the Cuban courts themselves
\vould enforce these promissory notes a11d require payment thereof in American dollars.
POINT FIVE
THE REJECTED
EVIDENCE WAS
XOT REPORT SHEE,.fS OF A REGISTERED
TRA~SFER AGENT, BUT ONLY TESTI-
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l\10NY AS TO W"HA'f COPIES OJi, SUCI-I
SHEETS WHICH HAD BEEN SENT 'fO
'l,HE DEJ:i-,ENDAN'l-, REFLECTED, \\rHlCfl
TES'I'llVIONY WAS HEARSAY AND NO'l,
ADMISSIBLE. SUCH REJECTED 'fESTIlVIONY IN ANY EVENT 'VAS I~Il\IATE
RIAL AND I'fS REJECTION UNPREJ-UDICIAL TO rrHE DEJi-,ENDANT, IN LIGHT
OF THE JURY'S ~--,INDING THAT NO
S'l"OCK HAD BEEN DELI\rERED TO
PLAIN'l,IFF AS SECURI~ry OR PLEDGE
FOR THE NOTES, AS CONTENDED BY
DEFENDANT.
In stating this fifth point defendant implies that
stock~ transfer sheets were offered by it and rejected on
the objection of hearsay . .r\. careful reading of defendant's argurnent, however, reveals the true fact that
the rejected hearsay testimony was an attempt to haYe
the defendant's past president, Doerrie, testify that he
had noticed from the copies of the transfer records sent
defendant company by its registered transfer agent in
New Jersey that there had been a transfer of the stock
certificates '" hich had been delivered to l\Ir. Schenin
as security for the notes. Defendant claims that the
eourt. in refusing to pern1it an answer to this question,
erred, so that "this appellant '"as deprived of proving
t-he date of the transfer and the Yalue of stock on such
date."
Defendant's "·itness Doerrie did in fact testify that
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the t\vo stock certi:fica tes he claimed he had g1ven
Schenin, totalling 42,000 shares, had been transferred
(ll. 2-it>) and that he kne'v Schenin had transferred this
stock before October 11, 1955 (R. 251); and further
that on that date Schenin ad1nitted to him such transfer.
(R. 24!8-249). '_fhe only matter defendant was precluded
fron1 sho,ving by the rejected testimony was the date
of the claimed transfer, in order to be able to establish
the value of the stock on that date.
This proof of date of transfer is not now material,
and the defendant cannot now show any prejudice in
its exclusion, in light of the jury's answer to Question
X o. 5 in the special verdict submitted to it, that the
defendant had not in fact delivered 42,000 shares of
stock to the plaintiff or his agent as security for the payment of the notes. By this answer the jury found that
no stock \vas involved in this case and therefore the value
of any stock as of a particular day was immaterial. The
jury did not answer Question 6 also submitted to it,
\Yhich only needed answering if they had found that
stock had been pledg~d, and which requested them to
find the value of such pledged stock on the day it might
have been transferred.
Even if the jury's answer to Question 5 had been
"yes", indicating stock had been pledged, this testimony
as to "~hat Doerrie had seen on a copy of transfer record
\\~as clearly objectionable. A registered transfer agent
is not an employee, as contended by plaintiff, but rather
an independent contractor whose records could be intro-
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duced upon a proper authentication through a person
having the custody and knowledge of such records. A
stock transfer agent., particularly one located some 1,000
miles from the offices of the corporation, clearly rneets
all the tests of being an independent contractor, viz.,
the right to perform certain work according to his own
methods, without being subject to the control of its
employer except as to the product or result of his work.
(See 27 Am. Jur. Independent Contractors_, Section 2,
page 481.)
Another objectionable aspect of the rejected testimony was the fact that it was not the best evidence, the
transfer records themselves being the best evidence as
to what they show, rather than the recollection of the
witness as to what he noticed thereon. There was no
showing that this primary evidence was unavailable to
defendant. Even if there had been an attempt to introduce such transfer records and a proper foundation
laid therefor, it is subtnitted they still might be objectionable as not being the best evidence, for _the stock
certificates themselves 'vhich were returned by the transfer agent to the defendant company (R. 2-1<7) 'vould be
the best evidence of their transfer. Such certificates 'vere
not presented by the defendant.

POINT SIX
THE

TRIAL

COURT

PROPERLY

}1,0lTND 'ri-I1\ T 'fHE AC,T OF THE DEFF4XD..c\~'r P 1-\ \"'"ING RENT..c\L PA l,..~IEXTS 'f()
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'fHE Pl.J.t\.IN'l,I~,F ~-,OR TRAXS~IIT'"f.c\.L TO
'filE LESSORS \\r .i\.S NO'"l, 1-\ COLLATERAL
-l\(~lt.EE)lEN1, OR PART OIT THE ''rRIT'f}:X l~ON'"rRAC'f OF SALE BE'l \\rEEN
'filE PAR1 IES RESULTING IN THE
\\"l{l'l'TEN NO'l,ES SUED ON, AND A
lT.t\IL URE BY PLAINTIF,F TO PAY ON
SUCH REN'l,ALS
AS THUS NOT A DEFEXSE TO A SUIT BY PLAINTIFF ON
THE NOTES.
1

1

''r

POINT SEVEN
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN
1,HE
P ARrriES DID NO'f REQUIRE ANY CON'flXUING OBLIGA'"fiON BY PLAIN'"fiF1?
}_,OR FURTHER PERFOR:\IANCE AND BY
ITS
TERMS
EXPRESSLY
RELIEv"""ED
PI~AINTIFF
0}-,
ANY FURTHER LIABILIT1~ FOR FUTURE AC1,IONS REGARDING THE PROPERTY CONVEYED TO
THE DEFENDAN'l\
As in previous points, defendant urged its two
points in one argument. Because they seem to be basically the same proposition, plaintiff will respond in the
same manner.
X o issue "~as submitted to the jury for determination of fact as to 'vhether the parties had agreed orally
or otherwise respecting the rental payments due on the
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mine, and whether any such agreement was a part of
the written agreement of sale ( Exhs. 4 and 5) between
the parties, which resulted in the notes sued upon. ~'or
was there any demand by the defendant for the subInission of such issues to the jury for a findn1g of fact
thereon.

Rule 4-9( a) U.R.C.P. provides that in such a circumstance it shall be dee1ned that the trial court made a
finding on any unsubmitted fact issue in accord with the
judgment. In other words, it must be determined that
the trial court found that the actions of defendant in
making rental payments to the plaintiff following the
execution of the written agreement between the1n \vas
not as a result of said agreement nor of a collateral agreement that was a part thereof so that a failure to pay on
such rental payments to the lessors by plaintiff did not
constitute a breach of the agreement of sale between the
parties relieving defendant of the obligation of making
payments on the promissory notes sued upon.
Such a finding by the court was not only proper,
but compelled by the evidence, and the applicable rules
of law. The evidence, contrary to defendant's contention,
did uot show an understanding between the parties
about rental payments in the forn1 of a collateral agreernent "' hich v•as an exception to the parol eYidence rule.
'l,he eYidence simply showed that an oral agreement 'vas
reached bet,veen Jack Cayias and plaintiff regarding the
sand tnine in .1\.ugust, 1958 under 'vhich agreement plaintiff ''"as to receiYe $20,000 and Cayias the right to oper28
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ate the 1nine. (R. 114-115). Plaintiff initially received
~~,000 iu cash at the time of the oral understanding, and
subsequently on August 28, 1958 was given the balance
of $1 {),000 iu the form of a check on the account of Jack
Cayias in a Salt Lake City bank. This check, after
deposit by plaintiff, \vas returned to him marked '"insufficient funds." (Ex. 11, R. 115).
~_,allowing

the return of this check, plaintiff requested Cayias, "·ho under the verbal agreement was to
1nake all future rental payments required on the sand
n1ine leases to the lessors, to make such rental payments
to the plaintiff so that he could be sure the payments
"·ere being made. (R. 196). This arrangement was
obYiously for plaintiff's protection for all he then had
"·as an oral agreement that Cayias would pay rentals
and develop and operate the mine for their joint benefit.
There "·as no evidence presented of any arrangement
"·ith defendant regarding the payment of rentals and
the testimony indicated that the defendant, after executing the 'vritten agreement, merely continued the practice begun by Cayias some n1onths before, after his check
had bounced, of making the rental payments to the plaintiff for transmittal on to the lessors. (R. 196).
The evidence clearly shows that all prior oral agreenlents or understandings regarding the sand mine bet\\·een the plaintiff, Jack Cayias, Doerrie, or any others
\Vere merged into the written agreement between plaintiff and defendant of :\larch 10, 1959 (Exs. 4 and 5)
and the trial court so indicated. (R. 252).
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A review of the written agreement between the
parties (Ex. 5) shows that it is a complete, clear, and
unambiguous agreement and not as contended by defendant, merely a partial execution of a parol agree1nent.
This complete docwnent specifically excludes the proposition that a collateral agreement regarding lease paytnents was not covered by its terms.
After describing in detail the leaseholds and personal property owned by Jacobs and his source of title
thereto, and indicating that all contracts both for the
personal property and the leases were given to defendant, the agreement provides as follows:
"FOURTH: That taking into effect everything that has been agreed Mister SID
JACOBS sells, leases and transfers by this document in favor of DELTA OIL CO~IPAXl"""
of UTAH all rights that correspond to the
mines and sand and gravel deposits related to
the Second Clause of this Agreement as of this
day, all the contracts previously drawn with the
owners of the farms "'here his mine is located, and
DELTA OIL COMPAN1""" OF UTAH is
therefore free to exercise all the rights required
and is bound to cotnply all the obligations pertaining to l\Iister SID JACOBS on said contracts. It is also agreed that DELT1\. OIL
CO)IP .t\.N1. . 0~~ U'l"'AH, has taken possession
of all the equipment and machinery, and fron1
this day on assutnes all responsibility for future
puyn1ents that corresponds to l\Iister J .£\C.OBS.
l~IF"'Til: The selling price is the sum of
Ei(rhtv-}-.,ive
'Thousand Dollars ($85,000.00)
t-1
•
that ~I~ster J ..t\l~OBS has made effective by
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sig·ning these documents, and "~ith no need of a
formal receipt or Letter of Credit in favor of
DEL'rr\. OIL CO~IP ..:'\_NY OF U'"l~-L\.H.
)lister ,J AC,OBS is not responsible for an eviction of the real estate transferred and sold in this
document, but only to the legitimacy of the real
estate that has been sold and of the legitimacy
of the contracts on the farms sold to him by its
owners on a previous date."
,-l'he foregoing provisions clearly indicate the
responsibility of defendant to make rental payments to
the lessors and that plaintiff is not responsible for any
future actions or defaults with respect to the leases or
contracts, and is only responsible for their validity or
legitimacy as of the sale date.
It is submitted that in this case the parol evidence
rule '"auld clearly prevent the enforcement of a prior or
collateral oral agreement between the parties regarding
rental payments, as called for by the defendant.
''Tilliston on Contracts, Vol. 2, Rev. Ed. Sec. 631
at page 1813 provides as follows:
"Parol evidence rule is not a rule of evidence
or one of interpretation or construction, but is a
rule of substantive la'v 'vhich 'vhen applicable
defines the li1nits of a contract. It fixes the subject
matter for interpretation though not itself a rule
of interpretation.''
and at page 1817:
"1\Jl courts agree that if the parties have integrated their agreement into a single written
memorial, all prior negotiations and agreements
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in regard to the same subject matter are excluded
from consideration whether they were oral or
written.''
and at page 1821, the author further states that it is
"generally held that the contract must appear on
its face to be incomplete in order to permit parol
evidence of additional ter1ns."
F,or many cases, including some Utah cases, reciting the
general principle that where the parties to a contract
have deliberately put their engagement in writing without any uncertainty as to the object or extent of such
enagement, it is conclusively presumed that the entire
agreement of the parties and the extent and manner of
their undertaking have been reduced to writing see
20 Am. Jur.~ Evidence~ para. 1099, page 958. In other
words, the parol agreement is merged in the written
agreement, and that all parol testimony of prior or contemporaneous conversations or declarations tending to
make a new and different contract are incompetent. (See
also 5 Wigmore~ Evidence~ Sec. 2400, page 236, and
Restatement of Contracts~ Sees. 237-244.)
The law relied on by defendant to avoid the parol
evidence rule relates to a situation 'vhere there is an oral
agreement "·hich is executed by subsequent delivery of
documents. Such clearly is not the case now before this
( . . ourt ,vhere prior oral agreements were merged into
the "·ritten agreement of sale (Exs. 4 and 5), ""hich
in turn produced the ""ritten override (Ex. 6) and the
t\YO notes being sued upon. ( Exs. I and 2) .
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'fhe only ease cited by defendant supporting its
position is 11aluz t,. Doolittle, 18 '\r is. :!06 "·hich was an
action to recover consideration paid for a note and mortgage sold by assig11ment from defendant to plaintiff.
Both parties knew the Inortgagor was financially irresponsible, but defendant had represented the mortgage
as valid. It subsequently appeared that the mortgagor
had no title and therefore both note and mortgage were
"·orthless. Defendant relied on the general rule that
"·hen parties reduce an agree1nent to writing the writing
is presumed to contain the 'vhole agreement and other
conditions cannot be shown by parol. The Court held
that ,vhile there was no rule better settled then this one,
it "·as inapplicable to an instrument (assignment) which
from its very nature did no! attempt to state the entire
agreen1ent but was adopted merely to transfer title. This
case only stands for the proposition that the presumption that a 'vriting contains the whole agreement does
not apply to deeds, assignments, and similar instruments.
Even if defendant might have proved an enforceable agreement between the plaintiff and defendant
"Therein plaintiff had assumed for a valid consideration
the obligation of paying the rental payments delivered
him by defendant, the breach by plaintiff of such an
agreement would not be a valid defense to a suit on these
t\\·o promissory notes which are independent and separate contracts. These notes were supported by a valuable consideration when they were given and were unconditional promises to pay money at a particular time.
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Parol evidence in contradiction of the terms of these
notes cannot be used to defeat payment thereon. (See
Van Fleet-Durkee Inc. v. Oyster, 205 P.2d 32.)
The only thing plaintiff might attempt in such a
circumstance would be to show that such an agreement
was a subsequent agreement and therefor not invalid
under the parol evidence rule or a separate independent
agreement for plaintiff's services. Defendant in that
situation could possibly_ sue plaintiff for a breach of a
subsequent independent agreement to perform services
for it and attempt to prove its damages as a result of
the breach by plaintiff thereof.
Defendant did not attempt to do this, for the testimony of all the witnesses showed that the arrangement
to make rental payments to the plaintiff was not a valid
agreement supported by consideration, subsequent to
the written agreement of March 11, 1959, nor collateral
thereto, and that it simply arose as a result of plaintiff's request to Cayias so1netime in 1958 after the
Cayias check had been returned and that no other
arrangements were made between defendant and plaintiff.
Another and even more compelling reason why
defendant did not atten1pt to establish an independent
subsequent agree1nent to perform these services by the
plaintiff 'vas that it could not show that it suffered any
d:.unage as a result of the plaintiff's failure to pay on
the rental payn1ents. Defendant voluntarily abandoned
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its right in the Cuban sand property and in the equipnlent for operating it in October of I959, at which time
so far as it knew its leases and possessary rights had
never been terminated or impaired. (R. 240).
'fhe jury's findings did not determine when or how
the leases were supposed to have terminated. Defendant
in its brief
,.. also fails to make this certain other than to
allege it occurred following the written agreement of
)larch II, I959. If defendant contends the leases automatically terminated upon failure to pay a 1nonths rent
the evidence is clear that such forfeiture would be the
result of defendant's own failure to pay the May I959
rental payment. Defendants proof of rental payment
sho,ved that the only rental payments made by it to
plaintiff was the April I, I959 payment, evidenced by a
receipt (Ex. I3), the June I, I959 payment, evidenced
by a check (Ex. I2), two months' subsequent payments,
evidenced by a receipt, undated (Ex. I4), and the paynlent of $3,000 in October of I959, which Doerrie said
made up for several months' rental payments that
defendant had been delinquent in paying. (R. 24I, 242).
The acknowledgment by defendant's president that
defendant had missed several pay1nents and then had
made them up clearly sho"·s that the leases had no automatic termination date. Plaintiff himself testified that so
far as he knew the leases had never been terminated
by the lessor for no payment of rental (R. I94, I95) and
that no one representing defendant had ever advised
him of such termination. (R. 20I). Plaintiff established
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by written checks that he had made the rental payments
up to May 1, 1959. (Ex. 17}.
It is clear this voluntary gratuitious service of plaintiff to defendant was not a condition or part of the
written agreement between the parties and in no way
affected the obligation to pay the promissory notes. Any
attempt to limit an unconditional promise to pay found
in negotiable promissory notes by parole evidence that
such promise was contingent upon the performance of
future actions by the payee must be unsuccessful.
Defendant, by its failure and inability to plead and
prove an independent enforceable agreement by plaintiff to pay rentals on behalf of defendant, and to show
any damages to it resulting from loss of the leaseholds,
received all that it possibly could have from the trial
court when it was given a set-off against its obligation
for the amount of the notes in the amount of the rentals
paid by defendant to plaintiff which plaintiff couldn't
show by documentary evidence he had paid on to the
lessors.

POINT EIGHT
RULE 49 (a) U.R.C.P. AUTHORIZES
'fHE l"'OURT TO REQUIRE A JURY TO
RE1~URN A SPECIAL 'TERDICT IN THE
FOll~l 0~-, SPECIAL ''TRITTEN FINDINGS
{:J.>ON THE ISSUES, AND PRO,riDES
TIIr\ T IF TI-lE COUR'l, OMITS ANY ISSl__1 E
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0~,

~.,.r\.l~T

RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS
OR 'I'HE E\TIDJ~NCE, A PARTY ''TAl\rES
'fHE RIGHT '1,0 A TRIAL BY JURY OF
THE ISSUE SO O~liT'fED, UNLESS HE
DE:\I.t\NDS I'I'S SUBMISSION, AND IF NO
DJ~:)l1\.XD IS ~I.t\.DE, THE COURT SHALJ..J
llE DEEMED TO HAVE MADE A FINDING IN ACCORD WI'l,H THE JUDG.NIENT
.1\.S 'fO SUCH OMITTED ISSUE.
On page 12 of the defendant's brief it lists an
"'Eighth Point," 'vhich provides as follows:
"'Vhen a case is submitted to the jury upon
the special verdict, all material, controverted
issues must be submitted to the jury, and the failure to submit the issue, the answer to which is
necessary to recovery in law, is fatal and cannot
be cured by any finding of the court."
Although this point is recited, it is not argued. For that
reason plaintiff will only state that this proposition
urged by defendant is contrary to Rule 49 (a) U.R.C.P.
(See also discussion of this rule under plaintiff's points
Six and Seven.)

CONCLUSION
The plaintiff in conclusion respectfully submits that
the judgment of the District Court was lawful and
proper for the following reasons:
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I. The court had jurisdiction of the case, which it

properly exercised, over the untimely application of
the defendant to dismiss.
2. The notes sued upon could only be paid in either

American dollars or Cuban pesos, and in either case the
obligation of the defendant amounted to $21,000.00
United States currency on each note.
3. There was no error in the testimony rejected by

the Court as to the date of transfer of the stock certificates, and defendant was not prejudiced by such
rejection.
4. Plaintiff's action in failing to pay rental pay-

ments received from defendant and any subsequent lease
termination as result thereof, did not create a defense
available to defendant to avoid liability on the promissory notes sued upon.
5. The liability of the maker of negotiable promis-

sory notes containing unconditional promises to pay
cannot be defeated by the maker presenting parol evidence that such unconditional promise was contingent
upon the performance of future acts by the party.
It is respectfully suggested that while defendant
presented many defenses, none of them reflected the
real reason its new officers attempted to avoid defendant's obligations on these notes; namely, that the drastic
changes wrought by the Castro regime in Cuba soon
after defendant's acquisition of the sand mine made its
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projected mining· venture impossible. and the acquired
property valueless. That all defendant's defenses were
factually unfounded is apparent from the significant
actions of the defendant's then president, Theo Doerrie,
in paying the delinquent monthly rental payments in
October of 1959, when defendant had decided to abandon the property, and President Doerrie's undisputed
acknowledgments to the plaintiff after the notes had
become due in Septmeber and December of 1959, that
defendant would pay them as soon as a merger was
accomplished. (R. 200, 240).
'

Respectfully submitted,
DAVID K. WATKISS
721 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
EDWARD NATHAN
515 Madison Avenue
New York City, New York

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
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